Judicial Review of Partial Arbitral Awards under
Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act
Jennifer M. Rhodest
Arbitration allows parties to partially contract out of the public
judicial system and resolve their disputes in a contractually created forum. Recently, however, several federal courts have attempted to take
back more power for themselves in the arbitration arena. In 1925,
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")' to protect the
integrity of arbitration clauses and ensure that a party could not evade
the purpose of a contractual arbitration clause by trying to supplant
the agreed-upon private judge with a federal judge. The FAA achieves
this goal by greatly limiting the federal courts' ability to exercise jurisdiction over arbitral decisions.2 This ensures that courts do not frustrate one of the main purposes of arbitration by substituting their
judgment for that of the decisionmaker selected by the parties. The
FAA also limits when parties can seek judicial review by not allowing
a court to review the case until the arbitrator has issued a judgment on
the entire dispute. This prevents parties from shuttling back and forth
between arbitrator and court and impeding a swift and streamlined
dispute resolution.!
Imagine that Company A enters into a contract to transport and
deliver Company B's widgets to Merchant C and that this contract includes a clause in which the parties agree to submit all disputes arising
from the contract to arbitration. After delivering the widgets, Company A sends Company B an invoice, requesting payment. Company
B refuses to pay anything, arguing that a portion of the goods was
t B.S. 1997; A.M. 2000, The University of Illinois-Urbana; J.D. Candidate 2003, The University of Chicago.
I Federal Arbitration Act, Pub L No 25-401, 43 Stat 883 (1925), codified at 9 USC §§ 1-16
(2000).
2
See, for example, 9 USC § 3 (requiring any suit or proceeding to be stayed if any issue
involved is referable to arbitration); 9 USC § 16 (allowing appeals from a court decision not to
compel arbitration, but not allowing appeals from a court decision to compel arbitration); 9 USC
§ 10(a) (providing limited grounds for vacating an arbitral award).
3
See, for example, 9 USC § 10(a)(4) states that a court may vacate an arbitral award if the
arbitrators so "exceeded their powers" or "imperfectly executed them" that a "mutual, final, and
definite" award is not possible. Courts have held this explicitly to mean that an award will not be
enforced unless final. See, for example, United TransportationUnion v Gateway Western Railway
Co, 284 F3d 710, 713 (7th Cir 2002) ("The Federal Arbitration Act is explicit that an award is unenforceable unless final, 9 USC § 10(a)(4).").
4
See Part I.A.
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damaged in shipment. After the parties enter into arbitration, the arbitrator first decides that Company A must be paid in full for the widgets successfully delivered. Before the arbitrator can decide the remaining claims, however, Company B goes to federal court to have the
partial award vacated. Should a court be able to exercise jurisdiction
over Company B's claim?
The FAA requires that courts give broad deference to an arbitrator's decisions and decline to review the arbitrator's awards until he or
she has issued a final judgment. Under the longstanding judicial interpretation of what constitutes a final arbitral award as required by
9 USC § 10(a)(4)-an interpretation that consciously tracks the final
judgment rule-partial awards may not be enforced. Recently, however, some courts have adopted a more flexible understanding of finality. In doing so, they have exercised jurisdiction over claims by parties seeking to enforce partial arbitral awards. These courts reason that
a strict definition of finality might actually impede the swift resolution
of arbitral disputes by making the parties wait for enforcement of a
ruling on one issue until the arbitrator has ruled on the other issues in
the case. They support the exercise of jurisdiction over the partial
awards by drawing analogies to FRCP 54(b), which permits interlocutory review of a district court order when such review furthers the
twin goals of expediency and judicial efficiency
In this Comment, however, I outline several reasons why courts
should adhere to the longstanding rule forbidding interlocutory review and not loosen the finality requirement embodied in Section
10(a)(4). First, the analogy between a court's review of a partial arbitral award and an appellate court's review of a district court's partial
judgment is inapt. While Rule 54(b) expressly grants appellate courts
the power to review district courts' partial judgments, the FAA makes
no corresponding grant of authority to courts to review partial arbitral
awards. Second, the relaxed approach to arbitral finality undermines

FRCP 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the partiesshall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties,and the order or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicatingall the claims and the rights
and liabilitiesof all the parties.

5
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the goal of deference to arbitrators. Third, arbitration is a creature of
contract, and courts should not "rewrite" the contract ex post.
In Part I, I examine the motivation behind the FAA, the benefits
of arbitration, and the finality requirement for judicial review. In Part
II, I scrutinize the caselaw that has recently deviated from the finality
requirement. Finally, in Part III, I recommend that courts should not
loosen the finality requirement because there is no congressional authorization to do so, and such an interpretation would undermine
Congress's pro-arbitration policy. Furthermore, the parties can always
contract around anticipated problems by explicitly providing for interlocutory review.
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT

Before analyzing the arguments for and against interlocutory appeals of arbitration, one must understand the background of the FAA,
as well as the proper role of the courts to promote arbitration. Federal
policy is pro-arbitration, and this policy may be properly promoted
only by limiting the instances in which courts can intervene.
A. Arbitration
Originally passed in 1925, the FAA was designed by Congress to
'
allow parties to avoid "the costliness and delays of litigation and, at a
time of severe judicial hostility to arbitration, to place arbitration
agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts. ' 8 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly acknowledged-as recently as January 20029that judicial hostility to arbitral agreements was the primary motivation for the Act's passage and that the avoidance of costs and delays
was merely secondary.' ° Since the passage of the FAA, federal policy
has consistently encouraged arbitration and has directed courts to reScherk v Alberto-Culver Co, 417 US 506,510-11 (1974).
Gilmer v Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp, 500 US 20, 24 (1991) (noting that the FAA was
enacted to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed
at English common law and had been adopted by American courts").
8
To Validate Certain Agreements for Arbitration, HR Rep No 96,68th Cong, 1st Sess 1-2
(1924) ("[T]he jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction ... survived for so lon[g] a
period that the principle became firmly embedded.... The courts have felt that the precedent
was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment."). See also To Make Valid
and Enforceable Certain Agreements for Arbitration, S Rep No 536, 68th Cong, 1st Sess 2-3
(1924) (describing the need and benefits of enforceable arbitration awards).
9 See EEOC v Waffle House, Inc, 534 US 279,289 (2002).
10 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc v Byrd, 470 US 213,220-21 (1985) ("[P]assage of the Act was
motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties
had entered, and we must not... allow the fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution to overshadow the underlying motivation."). See also Part II.A.
6
7
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solve any questions concerning the scope of arbitrable issues on the
side of arbitrability."
Given the importance that Congress places on providing parties
with the opportunity to arbitrate, it is useful to consider how parties
may benefit from arbitration. Congress encourages arbitration because it has many qualities that make it a valuable alternative to litigation. 2 The hallmarks of arbitration, "access to expertise"'3 and
"adaptability,"" are hard to find in traditional litigation. Because
arbitration is a private system of justice that is entered into voluntarily via
contract," parties can tailor their dispute resolution to their specific
6
commercial needs.1
For example, parties 8can contract over what issues
will be arbitrated,'7 the
choice of forum,' the type of arbitrator to pre11 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1, 24
(1983) (noting that the FAA manifests "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements").
12
Of course it should be noted that there can also be a downside to arbitration. One common concern is that when an experienced player in arbitration (such as a large manufacturer)
arbitrates with a novice (such as a small supplier), the experienced player will have an advantage
by being more familiar with the system and because the arbitrator may tend to favor the experienced player in order to get repeat business. However, given that arbitration agreements are voluntarily entered into, there is a presumption that the benefits outweigh the downside.
13 An example where expertise isimportant is in labor relations. See Lon
L. Fuller, Collective Bargainingand the Arbitrator,1963 Wis L Rev 3, 11:
Labor relations have today become a highly complicated and technical field.... It has developed its own vocabulary... In the nature of things few judges can have had any very extensive experience in the field of industrial relations. Arbitrators, on the other hand, are
compelled to acquire a knowledge of industrial processes, modes of compensation, complex
incentive plans, job classifications, shift arrangements, and procedures for layoff and recall.
14 "The presentation of evidence and argument in litigationis governed by
rules of procedure and evidence enacted by the government. In contrast, the rules of procedure and evidence
in arbitration are, with few exceptions, whatever the contract says they are." Stephen J. Ware, Alternative Dispute Resolution § 2.3(c) at 21 (West 2001).
15 See IDS Life Insurance Co v Royal Alliance Association, Inc, 266 F3d
645,649 (7th Cir
2001) (referring to the "voluntary contractual nature" of commercial arbitration). Form contracts
that contain "take-it-or-leave-it" propositions requiring arbitration are considered voluntary
agreements for purposes of the FAA. See Metro East Center for Conditioning and Health v
Qwest Communications International,Inc, 294 F3d 924,926 (7th Cir 2002).
16 See Volt Information Sciences, Inc v Board of Trustees of Leland StanfordJunior
University, 489 US 468,479 (1989) (Parties may "specify by contract the rules under which [the] arbitration will be conducted."). See also Baravati v Josephthal,Lyon & Ross, Inc, 28 F3d 704, 709 (7th
Cir 1994) ("[Slhort of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or ...
a panel of three monkeys, parties
can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern the arbitration of their disputes; parties are as free to specify idiosyncratic terms of arbitration as they are to specify any other terms
in their contract.").
17 See Mastrobuono v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc, 514 US 52, 57
(1995) ("[Plarties are
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.... [T]hey may limit by
contract the issues which they will arbitrate.").
18 See In re Salomon Inc ShareholdersDerivative Litigation 91,68 F3d
554,558-59 (2d Cir
1995) (stating that several circuits, the Second Circuit included, have held that contracts contain-
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side," how much discovery to allow,'° the schedule, 1 the length of the
hearing,2 and what rules of evidence to follow.3 Parties can also

choose whether they want the arbitrator to issue an opinion or just the
outcome."
In choosing the type of arbitrator desired, the parties can choose
an expert in the subject matter being disputed. An expert is often preferred to a jury, which may not understand complex technical issues, or
a judge, who is by necessity a generalist. When both parties are confident that any potential disputes will be resolved by an industry expert
who understands the background of the dispute, and therefore will

make decisions more efficiently and more accurately than a judge, the
expands. 6 Also, allowing
range of contractual possibilities greatlyindirectly
benefits the pubthose with expertise to decide the dispute

ing clauses requiring arbitration in accordance with the rules of some private organization are
designating the private organization as the exclusive arbitral forum).
19 See Gateway Coal Co v United Mine Workers of America, 414 US 368, 379 (1974)
("[P]arties are always free to choose an arbitrator whose knowledge and judgment they trust.").
There is often a requirement that the arbitrator in a maritime dispute be a "commercial man."
See WK. Webster & Co v American PresidentLines, Ltd, 32 F3d 665,668 (2d Cir 1994) ("[T]he
charter party required the arbitrators to be 'commercial men conversant with shipping matters."').
20
See American Arbitration Association, Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures,
Section L-5(c), online at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747 (visited Jan 30, 2003)
("The parties may conduct such document discovery as may be agreed to by all the parties provided, however, that the arbitrator(s) may place such limitations on the conduct of such discovery as the arbitrator(s) shall deem appropriate.").
21 Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problemsin the Making andApplication of Law 310 (Foundation 1994) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey,
eds):
Within broad limits ... private parties who submit an existing dispute to arbitration may
write their own ticket about the terms of submission, if they can agree to a ticket.... The
arbitration of an existing dispute is the parties' dream, and they can make it what they want
it to be.
22 See In re A.H. Robins Co, Inc,42 F3d 870,874 (4th Cir 1994) (upholding arbitration provisions including terms "describ[ing] the choosing of a panel of arbitrators, [and] the length of
their services").
23 See Volt, 489 US at 479 ("Just as [the parties] may limit by contract the issues which they
will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be
conducted.") (citation omitted).
24
See United Steelworkers of America v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp, 363 US 593, 598
(1960) ("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award.").
25 See Commonwealth Coating Corp v Continental Casualty Co, 393 US 145, 150 (1968)
(White concurring) ("It is often because [arbitrators] are men of affairs, not apart from but of
the marketplace, that they are effective intheir adjudicatory function.").
26
See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms,and Institutions,99 Mich L Rev 1724,1741 (2001).
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lic courts by diverting some of the more technical and esoteric dis-

putes."
Arbitration reduces the cost and length of litigation. Parties who

agree to arbitrate trade "the procedures and opportunity for review of
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration."' There is typically less discovery than in regular litigation;
procedures are informal; there are fewer motions; the hearings are
shorter; and appeals are limited. Therefore, arbitration will often proceed more quickly than litigation. While a typical employment dispute

takes 2.5 years to resolve in court,29 the average arbitration takes 8.6
months."
There is a greater degree of privacy in arbitration. In litigation,
sensitive information normally becomes part of the public record.31
Courts rarely grant motions to seal this information, even if the parties had previously entered into a secrecy agreement. 2 With arbitration, the existence of the dispute can be kept private, including the na-

ture of the claims and allegations, as well as the documents and testi-

mony." This prevents the dispute from ending up on the front page of

The Wall Street Journal.More importantly, in the commercial context,

it prevents a party's opponent from learning its financial bottom line.
If, for example, Company A is a manufacturer and is in a dispute with
Company B, one of its repeat customers, Company A would not want
Company B to have access to Company A's actual costs for the good
produced. Such knowledge adversely affects Company A's bargaining
position in the future. When litigating in the courts, it is not only Com-

See Conticommodity Services, Inc v Philipp & Lion, 613 F2d 1222, 1224 (2d Cir 1980)
(noting that arbitration "eases the workload of the courts").
28 Gilmer, 500 US at 31 (1991).
29
See Hooters ofAmerica, Inc v Phillips,173 F3d 933,936 (4th Cir 1999).
30 See Lewis L. Maltby, PrivateJustice: Employment Arbitrationand Civil Rights, 30 Colum
Hum Rts L Rev 29,55 (1998).
31
See Nixon v Warner Communications,Inc, 435 US 589, 597 (1978) ("The courts of this
country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents. [This right is not limited to those with] a proprietary interest in
the document or ...
need for it as evidence in a lawsuit.") (citations omitted).
32 Public access is important "to appreciate fully the often significant events at issue in
public litigation and the workings of the legal system." Newman v Graddick, 696 F2d 796, 802
(11th Cir 1983). "Not only the legislature but also students of the judicial system are entitled to
know what the heavy financial subsidy of litigation is producing." Baxter International,Inc v Abbott Laboratories,297 F3d 544, 547 (7th Cir 2002). For this reason, dispositive documents to a
court proceeding cannot be kept secret, even if both parties agree to secrecy. See id.
33 Closed arbitration is "a sure path to dispute resolution with complete confidentiality."
Baxter, 297 F3d at 548.
27
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pany B that will have access to this information, if dispositive of the
competitors. 3
dispute, but potentially all buyers and fellow
In an effort to promote arbitration, the FAA purposefully limits

the ability of courts to review arbitral awards.35 The less involved

courts are in the process, the more parties will see arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation. While the FAA authorizes federal courts

to enforce arbitral awards,3' it greatly limits the grounds on which a
court can vacate an arbitral award. These grounds are generally wholly

divorced from the merits of an arbitrator's decisions so as to avoid the
danger of undermining the integrity of the arbitral process. The narrow scope of review preserves the benefits that arbitration offers and

"prevent[s] arbitration from becoming a 'preliminary step to judicial
, 7
resolution.'
B.

Finality Requirement under the FAA

By restricting when courts may review arbitrators' decisions,
Congress prevented courts from substituting their judgment for that
of the arbitrators. The FAA prevents parties from shuttling back and

forth between the arbitrator and court, frustrating the effort to
achieve a swift and streamlined resolution of the dispute. This Part

discusses the finality requirement under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.
The final judgment rule has its roots in English common law jurisprudence, and has been a part of our American system since the Jusame
diciary Act of 1789.'8 The FAA finality requirement provides thesuch
as
benefits that the final judgment rule historically has provided,

34 For a general discussion of the importance of privacy in industry settings, see Omri BenShahar and Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 Yale L J 1885 (2000).
35 See Parts L.A and I.B.1.
36
The federal courts have jurisdiction only over contracts involving interstate commerce
or maritime transactions. 9 USC § 2 states that all written arbitration provisions in "any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" are "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable [in federal court], save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 9 USC § 1 defines "maritime transactions" and "commerce" and
notes that the FAA will not apply to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
37 Eljer Manufacturing v Kowin Development Corp, 14 F3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir 1994). See
also Barbier v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc, 948 F2d 117, 120 (2d Cir 1991) ("It is well-settled
that judicial review of an arbitration award is narrowly limited."); Eljer,14 F3d at 1254 ("Arbitration does not provide a system of 'junior varsity trial courts' offering the losing party complete
and rigorous de novo review."), citing NationalWrecking v InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters, Local 731,990 F2d 957, 960 (7th Cir 1993).
38
Sections 21,22, and 25 required final judgments before an appeal could be taken, and no
interlocutory appeals were allowed. For a general discussion on the history of the final judgment
rule, see Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L J 539, 548-51
(1932).
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avoiding the waste of judicial resources and not allowing parties to delay justice or harass the other side by using seriatim appeals. Over
time, there have been a few exceptions to the finality requirement in
our legal system, but the large majority of these exceptions are statutory. Of those, FRCP 54(b) is the most relevant for our purposes because the courts that have applied a loosened finality requirement under the FAA have done so by analogy to this rule.
1. The FAA's finality requirement: 9 USC § 10(a)(4).
One way of narrowing the scope of judicial review, and hence
promoting arbitration, is to impose a finality requirement for judicial
review of arbitral awards. Section 10(a) lists the limited instances in
which a federal court can vacate an arbitral award: (1) where the
award was procured by "corruption, fraud, or undue means;" (2)
where there was "evident partiality" or "corruption in the arbitrators;"
(3) where there was "misconduct" or "misbehavior" on the part of the
arbitrator; and (4) where the arbitrators "exceeded their power" or so
"imperfectly executed" them that a "mutual, final, and definite" award
is not possible and the time within which the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired.
Courts have interpreted Section 10(a)(4), which requires a "mutual, final, and definite" award, to impose a finality requirement on judicial review of such awards because a vacatur is only appropriate under Section 10(a)(4) when arbitrators "imperfectly execute" their
powers and issue an award purported to be final but which, in fact, is
not.'4 Although Congress could have made the finality requirement
more explicit by not inserting it in the midst of a list of grounds on
which an arbitrator's decision can be vacated, the courts have found
the language of the Act to be unambiguous on this point.4 ' A "final"
award means that arbitration must be "complete ' '4' and "not interlocu-

39
USC § 10(a)(1)-(4).
40 See Michaels v Mariforum Shipping, SA, 624 F2d 411, 414 (2d Cir 1980). The court also

noted: "That section has no application to an interim award that the arbitrators did not intend to
be their final determination on the issues submitted to them." Id.
41 See id:
[I]t is only after an award has been made by the arbitrators that a party can seek to attack
any of the arbitrators' determinations in court.... [A] district court is without authority to
review the validity of arbitrators' rulings prior to the making of an award. Where ...
arbitrators make an interim ruling that does not purport to resolve finally the issues submitted to
them, judicial review is unavailable.
42 See Local 36.Sheet Metal Workers Intl Assoc, AFL-CIO v Pevely Sheet Metal Co, Inc, 951
F2d 947,949-50 (8th Cir 1992).
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tory," 3 which in turn means that the arbitrator must have already decided all issues presented, including both liability and damages."
Combined with the term "mutual," it means that all issues involving
all parties have been decided. "Definite" means that "the award is suf-

ficiently clear and specific to be enforced should it be confirmed by
the district court and thus made judicially enforceable. ' '5 Where courts
have deviated from strict adherence to the final judgment rule, they
have done so by playing with the definitions of these terms-not by
attacking whether the FAA has a finality requirement for judicial

jurisdiction.46
2. The final judgment rule.

The final judgment rule has long been a part of our American jurisprudence because of the benefits it provides to the legal system.
Congress adopted the same finality requirement, incorporated in Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, to maintain those benefits. Historically,

courts have stringently enforced the FAA's finality requirement in the
same way they have enforced the final judgment rule. 7 In other words,
a district court can only enforce an arbitral award under the same circumstances that a court of appeals can review a judgment of the district court-if the decision disposes of all claims involving all parties

on the merits. For many decades, the interpretation of arbitral finality
has tracked the definition of finality provided by the final judgment
rule.

43
El Mundo Broadcasting Corp v United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 116 F3d 7, 9
(1st Cir 1997).
44 See Michaels, 624 F2d at 413-14.
45
IDS Life Insurance,266 F3d at 650.
46
See Part II.A. All courts adhere to a finality requirement to some degree. As some circuits adopt looser definitions of finality, however, we should expect to see an increased number
of published opinions, such as IDS Life Insurance,addressing the final judgment rule in more detail.
47 See Millmen Local 550, United Brotherhoodof Carpentersand Joiners of America, AFLCIO v Wells Exterior Trim, 828 F2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir 1987):

To allow judicial intervention prior to the final award would contravene the fundamental
federal ... policy of deference to contractual dispute resolution procedures.... Moreover,
interlocutory review of nonfinal arbitration awards would defeat the purpose of 28 USC
§ 1291 (1982) to avoid piecemeal litigation of a claim.
(citations omitted). Millmen Local was governed by the Labor Management Relations Act, but
"federal courts rely on FAA cases to inform their LMRA analysis." Providence Journal Co v
ProvidenceNewspaper Guild, 271 F3d 16, 19 n 3 (1st Cir 2001), citing United PaperworkersInternational Union v Misco, Inc, 484 US 29,40 n 9 (1987).
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The well-accepted purpose of the final judgment rule is to avoid
wasting judicial resources."8 Multiple appeals for the same case take up
appellate judges' time," and the issues the appellate court decides may
become moot by decisions on later issues. The final judgment rule
also keeps litigants from using seriatim appeals as a tool of delay or
harassment." Exceptions to this rule, such as FRCP 54(b), are therefore to be granted neither lightly nor routinely.52 The Supreme Court
frequently has noted that this requirement "is not one of those technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth
working of our federal system."53 The finality requirement of the FAA
therefore serves a twofold purpose: It protects Congress's pro-

arbitration policy by preventing courts from unduly interfering in private contract in the face of judicial hostility toward arbitration ' and
streamlines the process, for example by preventing parties from shuttling back and forth between the arbitrator and court.
3. Exceptions to the final judgment rule.
The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

formed a new "civil action" that is wide in scope, created a need to
carve out some exceptions to the final judgment rule." Under the new

rules, the number of claims and parties within the same case grew exSee Stringfellow v ConcernedNeighbors in Action, 480 US 370,380 (1987).
See New York State National Organizationfor Women v Terry, 886 F2d 1339, 1349 (2d
Cir 1989) ("[I]t is a waste of judicial resources for two courts to be considering the same issues in
the same case at the same time."), citing Griggs v Provident Consumer Discount Co, 459 US 56,
58 (1982).
50 See Fox v Baltimore City Police Department,201 F3d 526,530 (4th Cir 2000).
51 See Flanaganv United States, 465 US 259, 263-64 (1984); FirestoneTire & Rubber Co v
Risjord, 449 US 368,374 (1981), quoting Cobbledick v United States, 309 US 323,325 (1940).
52
See Curtiss-Wright Corp v General Electric Co, 446 US 1, 8-10 (1980) ("Not all final
judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense
separable from the remaining unresolved claims.... Plainly, sound judicial administration does
not require that Rule 54(b) requests be granted routinely.").
53
Jefferson v City of Tarrant,522 US 75,81 (1997), quoting Radio Station WOW v Johnson,
326 US 120,124 (1945).
54
See Part I.A.
55 FRCP 54(b), Advisory Committee Note to the 1946 Amendments:
Rule 54(b) was originally adopted in view of the wide scope and possible content of the
newly created 'civil action' in order to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in judgment of
a distinctly separate claim to await adjudication of the entire case. It was not designed to
overturn the settled federal rule [prohibiting piecemeal disposal of litigation except in special instances covered by statute.
56
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated in 1938, when Congress
enacted the Rules Enabling Act, 28 USC § 2072, authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate
procedural rules. The Supreme Court, in turn, delegated its authority to committees of the Judicial Conference, which is a supervisory and administrative arm of the federal courts.
48
49
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ponentially."7 The rulemakers were particularly concerned with the po-

tential delays in justice resulting from the rigidity of the final judgment rule," and therefore sought to fashion a few well-defined excep-

tions to the final judgment rule. 9 These exceptions include 28 USC
§ 1292, which allows interlocutory appeals in limited circumstances;,o
28 USC § 1651, which authorizes grants of extraordinary writs of
mandamus; 6' FRCP 23(f), which allows interlocutory appeals for class

certification orders at the discretion of the appellate court; and the
collateral order doctrine, which allows orders to be considered final if
the order will "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.'' 3
The exception that bears the most on piecemeal appeals of arbitral orders is the one created by FRCP 54(b).6' This rule recognizes

that under a particular set of circumstances, the purposes of the final
57 See, for example, Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, HR Rep No 105-26, 105th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1997) ("Over the past two decades, filings in
the courts of appeals have increased by more than 200 percent.").
58
FRCP 54(b), Advisory Committee Note to the 1946 Amendments ("Rule 54(b) was
originally adopted in view of the wide scope and possible content of the newly created 'civil action' in order to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim
to await adjudication of the entire case.").
59 For a general discussion, see Timothy P Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion:Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 175,185-201 (2001).
60 Section 1292(a)(1) allows interlocutory appeals from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions." Sections
1292(a)(2) and (a)(3) allow interlocutory appeals for orders dealing with receiverships and determinations of rights and liabilities in admiralty cases respectively. Section 1292(b) allows an interlocutory appeal with the permission of both the district court judge and court of appeals for
orders involving a "controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion." In reality, § 1292(b) is used very rarely. In 1989, there were roughly 40,000 federal appeals filed. See Diana G. Culp, The Judiciary:Fixing the Federal Courts, 76 ABA J 63, 63
(June 1990). That year, only 330 interlocutory appeals were certified by district courts, and only
118 of those were accepted by appellate courts. See Michael Solomine, Revitalizing Interlocutory
Appeals in the FederalCourts, 58 Geo Wash L Rev 1165,1176 (1990) (Table la).
61 Such writs are given "sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances."
Brown v Gilmore, 533 US 1301, 1305 (2001), quoting Fishman v Schaffer, 429 US 1325, 1326
(1976). See also US S Ct Rule 20.1 ("Issuance by the Court of an extraordinary writ authorized
by 28 USC § 1651(a) is not a matter of right, but of discretion sparingly exercised.").
62
FRCP 23(0.
63
Cunningham v Hamilton County, 527 US 198, 206 (1999). For an in-depth discussion of
the collateral order doctrine, see Jeffrey D. Hanslick, Decisions Denying the Appointment of
Counsel and the FinalJudgment Rule in Civil Rights Litigation, 86 Nw U L Rev 782, 791-806
(1992).
64 FRCP 54(b) states:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of judgment.
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judgment rule-expedience and judicial efficiency-can best be
served by allowing exceptions to the rule. One can imagine situations
in which claims in a lawsuit are sufficiently unrelated that the disposition of one claim would not affect the disposition of others. In such
situations, delaying the appeal and final resolution of an interlocutory
order deciding such a claim would serve no purpose and could, indeed,
cause useless delay.6 Thus, the 1946 amendment to FRCP 54(b) allows
a district court, in a case with multiple claims, to enter a final judgment
to dispose of one or fewer than all of the claims for review, but "only
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."6 In 1961,
FRCP 54(b) was amended to allow the district court not only to enter
a final judgment for "one or more but fewer than all"6'7 of the claims,
but also for one or more but fewer than all of the parties."
FRCP 54(b) contains an important safeguard: It mandates that
the district court must certify that there is no just reason for delay.
This certification requirement allows district judges to retain control
over their own cases and decide when piecemeal review is beneficial.
This is important because it reduces the chance that the appellate
court will be given an issue to decide that, if reversed, could have an
adverse affect on the rest of the proceedings remaining before the district judge.
II. DEVIATIONS FROM THE FINALITY REQUIREMENT
OF SECTION 10(a)(4)

In recent years, a few courts of appeal have departed from the
strict finality requirement 9 and have allowed appeals of partial arbitral awards for those claims viewed as independent from the remaining claims still before the arbitrator. These courts justify their decisions by relying on the rationales supporting FRCP 54(b). They emphasize that it makes little sense not to enforce part of an award if it is
65
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1946 Amendment of FRCP 54(b) recognized this
and stated that the rule was intended to ensure that parties did not have to "await adjudication
of the entire case."
66 FRCP 54(b).
67
Id.
68 Id. The change was made because "[t]he danger of hardship through delay of appeal until the whole action is concluded may be at least as serious in the multiple-parties situations as in
multiple-claims cases." FRCP 54(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1961 Amendments.
69
See, for example, Publicis Communication v True North Communications; Inc, 206 F3d
725 (7th Cir 2000) (affirming that the arbitration tribunal's decision was final, despite the fact
that unrelated issues had not yet been arbitrated); MetallgesellschaftAG v M/V Capitan Constante, 790 F2d 280 (2d Cir 1986) (allowing for an appeal of an arbitral award despite the fact
that claims "separate and independent" from the issue at hand remained before the arbitrators).
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factually and conceptually unrelated to the other claims that remain
before the arbitrators. These courts note that one reason arbitration is
preferred over litigation is because of the expectation that it will be
less expensive.0 If interlocutory review of the issues is not allowed,
they reason, it will cost the parties more money and time. Only a few
circuit courts have deviated from the finality requirement, and at least
one of those circuits-the Seventh-has recently expressed misgivings
about its departure from strict adherence to the final judgment rule
regarding arbitral awards.
Part A reviews Second and Seventh Circuit cases in which courts
most significantly have departed from the finality requirement for judicial review of partial arbitral awards. Part B then examines a series
of First Circuit cases in which the parties agreed to bifurcate arbitration into two distinct phases: an initial phase resolving liability and a
second phase awarding damages. In such cases, the First Circuit permits judicial review of arbitral awards, even when only one of the
phases of arbitration has been completed. In doing so, however, it relies on precedent that is unconvincing and not on point. An agreement
to bifurcate the proceeding into two distinct phases does not mean
that the parties have agreed to interlocutory review.
A. Cases Relaxing the FAA's Finality Requirement
The Second Circuit was the first circuit court to adopt a relaxed
interpretation of the finality requirement. Previously, the Second Circuit interpreted the finality rule strictly, stating that in order for an arbitral award to be considered final it had to be "intended by the arbitrators to be their complete determination of all claims submitted to
them .... not only [as to] liability, but also . .. damages."7' The court's
position changed, however, with its decision in MetallgesellschaftAG v
M/V Capitan Constante,2 in which it argued that when necessary, the
final judgment rule could be deviated from in order to meet the purpose of arbitration. 3

70
71
72

73

See Metallgesellschaft, 790 F2d at 282.
Michaels v Mariforum Shipping,SA, 624 F2d 411,413-14 (2d Cir 1980).
790 F2d 280 (2d Cir 1986).
Id at 282:

[T]he purpose of arbitration is to permit a relatively quick and inexpensive resolution of
contractual disputes ...[and it] would be a perversion of the salutary design for a [party] to
be denied the same prompt and commercially important relief from an arbitration panel
that it could have received from a court.
(citations omitted).
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Metallgesellschaftinvolved a dispute arising out of a shipping contract for fuel oil. The ship Capitan Constante transported and delivered freight for Metallgesellschaft, but Metallgesellschaft did not pay,
alleging short delivery and fuel contamination." In keeping with their
contract, the parties entered into arbitration, in which the arbitration
panel made a partial award in favor of Capitan Constante for the
value of the unpaid freight.75 The Second Circuit took jurisdiction over
the case and upheld enforcement of the partial arbitral award, even
though the panel had not yet decided the other issues before it.76 The
court was motivated to assert jurisdiction based on the strength of the
underlying claim.77 It emphasized that if the claim had been brought in
a court of law instead of arbitrated, Capitan Constante would undoubtedly be entitled to summary judgment for the amount of the unpaid freight." The court considered it "a perversion" that resolution of
a claim could occur more quickly in litigation than in arbitration. 9 The
court stated that fairness required prompt payment because the goal
of arbitration is to permit quick and inexpensive resolution of contractual disputes. " Therefore, it held that the issue of whether Metallgesellschaft was liable for the freight was an independent issue from the
payment.8' In a dissent, Judge Wilfred Feinberg wrote that courts
should not create exceptions to the final judgment rule for arbitration
because such an action requires congressional approval." Furthermore, he reasoned, while hearing the case at bar might result in speedier resolution of one party's claims, the long-term effect of allowing
piecemeal judicial review would be to "make arbitration more complicated, time consuming and expensive ' with an increasing number of
parties demanding such review.
Id at 281.
Id.
76 See id at 282.
77 See, for example, id at 281 ("It is a rule of ancient vintage that, where freight is payable
on delivery, it should be paid concurrently with the delivery of the goods.").
78 See id at 282.
79 Id.
80
See id, referring to Diapulse Corp v Carba,Ltd, 626 F2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir 1980).
81 See id.
82
Metallgesellschaft, 790 F2d at 284 (Feinberg dissenting):
74

75

The exception to the final judgment rule now embodied in Rule 54(b) required
proval of Congress. That body should do the amending of the arbitration statute to
a separate and independent claim exception to the finality requirement of
[10(a)(4)], if it finds such an amendment consistent with the goals of the arbitration
83
Id at 285. Judge Feinberg went on to say:

the approvide
section
statute.

After this decision, use of partial final awards will doubtless increase and, if the successful
parties can get partial awards confirmed by the district courts, it stands to reason that they
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The Seventh Circuit has also allowed judicial review of a partial
arbitral award, based on the same policy arguments made in Metallgesellschaft. In Publicis Communication v True North Communications,

Inc, ' two parties entered into a joint venture and agreed to arbitrate
almost all disputes arising from their partnership.n After their joint
venture fell apart, the parties entered into arbitration. One of the issues submitted for arbitration was whether Publicis had to turn over
its tax records to True North." Despite an order from the arbitrator to
turn over these records, Publicis refused.o In response, True North
filed a claim in federal court to have the arbitrator's order enforced.
The court held that an arbitral order requiring one party to hand
over its tax records to the other party would be treated as a final order, and hence reviewable, because considered in isolation, the order
was final7 despite the fact that the order did not end the arbitration.
The court justified its decision by saying that while "[a]rbitration can
be an effective way to resolve a dispute in less time, at less expense,
and with less rancor than litigating in the courts[,] [a]rbitration loses
some of its luster ... when one party refuses to abide by the outcome

and the courts are called in after all for enforcement."''
The Seventh Circuit has recently questioned the legitimacy of this
reasoning. In IDS Life Insurance Co v Royal Alliance Association," the

court criticized the Publicis decision. The court noted that while decisions such as Publicis employ a regime similar to the one that Rule
54(b) creates for federal litigation, this regime "is in tension with the
absence from the Federal Arbitration Act of any counterpart to that
rule.' ' " The IDS Life Insurance court stressed that "final" and "mutual" mean "that the arbitrators ... have resolved the entire dispute

(to the extent arbitrable) that had been submitted to them."93

will do so.... It will make arbitration more like litigation, a result not to be desired.
Id.
206 F3d 725 (7th Cir 2000).
Id at 727.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89
Id at 729.
90 Id at 727. The court cited an earlier Seventh Circuit case, Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co of Europe,Ltd v Continental Casualty Co, 37 F3d 345,348 (7th Cir 1994), which relied
on a holding in the Ninth Circuit. See Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp v Ohio Reinsurance
Corp, 935 F2d 1019,1022-23 (9th Cir 1991).
91 266 F3d 645 (7th Cir 2001).
92 Id at 650.
93 Id.
84

85
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Cases Involving Bifurcation Agreements

In Hart Surgical,Inc v UltraCision,Inc,94 the First Circuit, relying
on Metallgesellschaft," held that when the parties formally agree to bifurcate the liability and damages phases, a court has the power to review the arbitrator's decision after the arbitrator decides the liability
issue, but before he or she determines damages.6
In Hart Surgical,the parties had entered into a contract in which
Hart agreed to be the exclusive Canadian distributor for UltraCision's
products. This contract contained an arbitration clause." A few years
later, UltraCision terminated the distributorship for nonperformance. Upon commencing arbitration, the parties agreed to bifurcate the arbitration into liability and damages phases, with the approval of the arbitration panel.9 The arbitrators decided that UltraCision was liable for wrongfully terminating the distribution agreement."O UltraCision filed a motion to vacate that award."0 ' However,
both parties agreed to stay the request in order to "facilitate a settle-12
effort."'
ment" and "avoid the unnecessary expenditure of time and
The damages stage in arbitration stalled, and UltraCision urged the
federal court to review the arbitrator's finding of liability. '
The district court dismissed UltraCision's motion, holding that
under the FAA the award was not final, and therefore jurisdiction by
the court was not proper.' The court reasoned that since the parties
had asked the arbitrators to decide both liability and damages, an appeal of only one of these decisions was akin to an interlocutory appeal
and thus impermissible under the statute. '°5
The First Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held
that the district court had jurisdiction to review liability.'° Acknowledging the current circuit split, the court limited its holding to situations in which the parties have formally agreed to bifurcate at the arbitration stage.' 2
244 F3d 231 (1st Cir 2001).
95 790 F2d 280.
HartSurgical, 244 F3d at 235.
96
94

97

Id at 232.

Id.
Id.
100 Id.
101 See HartSurgical,Inc v UltraCision,Inc, 92 F Supp 2d 40,41 (D RI 2000).
102 Id.
98

99

103

See id.

104

See id at 43.

105

See id.

106

See Hart Surgical,244 F3d at 232.

107

See id at 236.
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The First Circuit nevertheless extended Hart Surgical's reach in
Providence Journal Co v Providence Newspaper Guild' by permitting
review of a partial arbitral award despite the lack of a formal bifurcation agreement.1 In that case, the parties arbitrated a dispute over the
interpretation of a clause in their collective bargaining agreement."0
At the arbitration hearing, the parties informally agreed to bifurcate
the proceedings into liability and damages."' After the arbitrator
found one party liable, he ordered the parties to try to negotiate an
acceptable remedy but retained jurisdiction in case the parties failed."2
After the parties failed to reach an agreement, ProvidenceJournal filed a motion in federal court to vacate the arbitral award, " ' even
though the arbitrator had not relinquished jurisdiction. The circuit
court held that judicial review of a partial arbitral award was appropriate because the parties intended to bifurcate the phases-formality
did not matter." ' Furthermore, the court argued, if the arbitrator had
not intended the decision on liability to be final, he would not have
felt the need to state he was retaining jurisdiction over the remaining
issues."' Therefore, the court found review proper."6
The First Circuit has thus made a quick and sharp deviation from
the finality requirement under the FAA. While the Seventh Circuit
similarly has deviated from the rule, the doubts the court expressed in
IDS Life Insurance may indicate that the court will move back to
strict adherence to the final judgment rule.
•

116

III. ADVANTAGES OF THE FAA's FINALITY REQUIREMENT
This Part explains why enforcing partial arbitral awards violates
the finality requirement in Section 10(a)(4) and contradicts the FAA's
broader policies. It also answers the concerns that have led several
108271 F3d 16 (1st Cir 2001).
109See id at 20. It is interesting to note that this decision was issued less than a year after
Hart Surgicaland both opinions were written by the same judge, Judge Juan Torruella.
110 Id at 18.
11 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id at 18.
114 See id at 19-20.
115 See id.

116The court's conclusion is far from obvious. The arbitrator's statement can also be taken
as evidence that the parties intended to fully resolve the dispute in arbitration. "It is a general
rule in common law arbitration that when arbitrators have executed their award and declared
their decision they are functus officio and have no power or authority to proceed further." Mercury Oil Refining Co v Oil Workers International Union, CIO, 187 F2d 980, 983 (10th Cir 1951),
disapproved of on other grounds by Textile Workers Union v Lincoln Mills, 353 US 448, 451

(1957).
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courts to loosen the finality requirement. First, arbitration is a creature of contract and allows parties to prevent more cumbersome arbitration proceedings, if they so desire. If they fail to do so, however, the
court should not "rewrite" the parties' contract by providing a more
streamlined process. Such action would benefit one party at the expense of the other. Second, the relaxed approach to finality undermines the FAA's goal of deferring to arbitrators by interfering before
the arbitrator has used his or her expertise, for which he or she was
hired, to decide the entire dispute. Third, analogies drawn to Rule
54(b) are inapt. There is no parallel provision in the FAA leading to
the negative inference that Congress did not intend to authorize an
exception to the final judgment rule. Further, Rule 54(b) permits interlocutory appeals only where the district court certifies that it is expeditious to do so. Courts that have exercised jurisdiction over partial
arbitral awards by analogizing to Rule 54(b) have failed to even mention this important measure. Finally, it is not clear that a looser finality
requirement will bring about a quicker, less expensive dispute resolution, as deviating courts hope.
A. Arbitration Is a Creature of Contract
One reason there is little cause for concern over the lack of
piecemeal judicial review is that arbitration is a creature of contract. If
there are circumstances unique to the parties, they can tailor their dispute resolution in a manner satisfactory to both sides. This weakens
the argument that courts must intervene in order to protect parties
from long, drawn-out disputes. In fact, courts should not allow piecemeal judicial review when the parties have not contracted for it because doing so rewrites the bargain that the parties struck ex ante.
1. Parties may craft the ground rules for arbitration.
Courts cannot justify judicial review simply on the need to ensure
a speedy resolution to the parties' disputes. Arbitration gives the parties themselves the opportunity to craft the format and scope of any
arbitration proceeding. Parties can require, for example, only one
claim per arbitration proceeding. They can also limit the scope of discovery and evidentiary rules. ' These measures have a great effect on
the length and breadth of any dispute resolution, and can control the
scope of arbitration and avoid surprise. Hence, we should not be as
worried about parties in an arbitration proceeding as we are about
117

See notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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parties in litigation. It is more important to adhere to the parties' contract than to allow a court to rewrite their contract in an attempt to
get a speedier resolution. The FAA was passed because when it came
to arbitration clauses, courts failed to place parties' agreements on the
same footing as other contracts. 1 8 When time is of the essence, parties
can ensure that time-saving devices are built into the contract. For example, the clause could provide that all issues raised in arbitration
must be decided within six months. The agreed-upon arbitrator would
have to agree to this time limit; the salary paid could be raised as
needed for this to be accomplished. This addresses the Second Circuit's concerns over quick payment for freight, for example. If parties
choose not to include this provision, then there is no reason for a
court to be paternalistically concerned.
2. Existence of bifurcation agreements underscores parties'
abilities to contract.
Arbitrations in which there is an agreement to bifurcate the
proceedings and arbitrations in which there is not such an agreement
pose conceptually different issues because in the former agreement
the parties have contracted away from the default rules that the FAA
provides. When the parties explicitly agree ex ante to divide up the arbitration, it is more convincing to allow judicial review of partial arbitral awards. This is subject, however, to the qualification that the parties in their agreement have explicitly agreed to judicial review of partial arbitral awards and not just requested that the arbitrator decide
the issues sequentially via bifurcation." 9 The fact that parties can agree
to bifurcate indicates that the parties are capable of arranging for
piecemeal judicial review. One reason why parties may agree to bifurcate liability and damages but not agree to piecemeal judicial review is
because it is not clear that allowing judicial review of the liability
phase before the arbitrator decides damages is quicker than allowing
the arbitrator to determine both liability and damages before the district court reviews the awards.
The First Circuit has allowed judicial review of partial arbitral
awards for cases in which the parties have a bifurcation agreement. In
none of these cases, however, including HartSurgical,2 ° did the parties
explicitly agree to piecemeal judicial review. Furthermore, the reliance
118 See Part I.A.

119 Parties agree to bifurcate liability and damages because it is quicker to decide liability
first. Then, if there is liability, the expensive process of discovery and hiring of experts can begin
for the purpose of determining damages.
120 See Part ll.B.
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on Metallgesellschaft, which did not contain a bifurcation agreement,
indicates that the First Circuit may be willing to adopt the broader
departure from the finality requirement.
3. Allowing review of partial arbitral awards effectively rewrites
the parties' contract.
We should be bothered when courts attempt to change the process for which the parties bargained. By doing so, the courts are essentially rewriting the parties' contract, which helps one party (who benefits from the quick resolution) and hurts another (who benefits from
proceeding in the way dictated by the agreement).
In addition, speed is not the sole consideration of the parties. If it
were, both sides would agree to flip a coin to decide their disputes.
Rather, parties voluntarily choose arbitration because they specifically
want to avoid the courts and/or want an adjudicator with expertise in
their field. To allow the courts to become involved in the process
ahead of schedule is to upset the bargained-for contract by allowing
judges to speak on the issues before the contracted-for expert has
spoken on all of the issues involved in the dispute.
4. Judicial review of partial arbitral awards does not necessarily
reduce costs and result in a speedier dispute resolution.
Even if speed and cost reduction were the sole considerations of
the alternative dispute resolution process, ' it is far from clear that
piecemeal review results in a quicker, cheaper resolution. Superficially
it may appear to lower the expected cost of resolving a dispute because an affirmation of no liability saves both sides from the cost of
disputing damages. However, this deviation from the finality requirement may burden society even more in terms of both time and money.
The number of parties who will run to the public courts to seek interlocutory appeal will increase, putting a greater burden on taxpayers,
not to mention the parties1 2 It also may reduce the settlement range
between the two parties. The expected value of the plaintiff's claim inConsider EEOC v Waffle House, Inc, 534 US 279,289 (2002) (stating that these were not
the primary concerns of Congress when passing the FAA).
122 See Production and Maintenance Employees' Local 504, Laborers' Intl Union of North
America,AFL-CIO v Roadmaster Corp, 916 F2d 1161,1163 (7th Cir 1990):
Arbitration will not work if legal contests are its bookends: a suit to compel or prevent arbitration, the arbitration itself, and a suit to enforce or set aside the award. Arbitration then
becomes more costly than litigation, for if the parties had elected to litigate their disputes
they would have had to visit court only once.
121
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creases, while the expected loss by the defendant decreases, so they

become less willing to bargain."
B.

Deference to Arbitrators

Deviating from the final judgment rule also changes the nature of
the relationship between the judge and arbitrator. Federal arbitration

policy mandates that arbitrators have the initial say in resolving the
'
dispute." Indeed, a court does not have jurisdiction to consider the
dispute until it has first been arbitrated except to decide whether to

compel arbitration.
A direct analogy can be drawn to primary agency jurisdiction in
administrative law. Under this regime, agencies possess primary jurisdiction over disputes arising in areas that fall within that agency's
exclusive area of expertise. ' Courts do not assert jurisdiction until the
agency has first decided the case before it. 2' Similarly, just as the scope
of review is limited by the FAA in the context of arbitration, so too is
it constrained by the Administrative Procedure Act in the context of
agency adjudication. Finally, the expertise concern is just as strong
with agencies, since in both cases the primary decisionmaker possesses
expertise lacked by the courts.

Allowing an expert to resolve the dispute is a primary reason parties contract for arbitration. ' Parties know that arbitrators have more
123 For an empirical study on the effects of bifurcation in traditional
litigation, see William
M. Landes, Sequentialversus Unitary Trials:An Economic Analysis, 22 J Legal Stud 99
(1993).
124 See Rothlein v Armour & Co, 391 F2d 574, 578-79 (3rd Cir 1968)
("[W]hen a comprehensive contractual procedure is available, such as arbitration, federal labor policy demands
both
initial recourse to such procedures and limited appeal from the decisions reached.")
(citations
omitted).
125 See, for example, Board of Education of City School District
of New York v Harris,622
F2d 599,606-07 (2d Cir 1979) (citations omitted):
Primary agency jurisdiction is a flexible concept, concerned with "promoting proper
relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory
duties." It is called into play when a court, having unquestioned jurisdiction over a case
involving matters governed by an administrative agency, determines which tribunal
should
make the initial adjudication, (Court's jurisdiction not ousted, but only postponed). The
exercise of the court's discretion is guided in this situation by a desire for uniformity of
regulation and the need for initial consideration by a body possessing special expertise in
the issue presented.
126 "Congress has made clear its intent to favor arbitration by deferring
to the expertise of
arbitrators ... [by] 'requiring that [courts] rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."'
Davis v
PrudentialSecurities,Inc, 59 F3d 1186, 1192 (1lth Cir 1995), quoting in part Shearson/American
Express,Inc v McMahon, 482 US 220,226 (1987).
127 See David B. Lipsky and Ronald L. Seeber, In Search
of Control: The Corporate Embrace ofADR, 1 U Pa J Labor & Empl L 133,138-39 (1998) (showing in a table that the
top two
reasons why corporations arbitrate -taking away the reasons 'required by contract'
and 'more
satisfactory process,' which only beg the question why-are 'limited discovery' (59.3
percent)
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expertise than judges in the parties' particular field," and parties often
explicitly include a clause in their contract requiring that the arbitrator have such expertise."9 Courts, therefore, should not exercise jurisdiction to review the arbitrator's decision until the arbitrator, presumptively using his expertise, has decided the entire dispute. For just
as the final judgment rule is motivated by concerns that subsequent
developments in a case before a district court might greatly affect the
significance of interlocutory decisions by the district court, it is just as
likely that a final decision by the arbitrators will cast a partial award in
a very different light."
C.

Lack of Jurisdiction over Partial Arbitral Awards

The final judgment rule has been a part of the federal judicial sys'
tem since the first Judiciary Act of 1789. Exceptions to this rule have
been few and well defined and were, for the most part, created in response to FRCP's creation of a broad civil action.132 Arbitration, on the
other hand, is completely contractual and allows cumbersome proceedings to be avoided with forethought. Because Congress has not
authorized piecemeal judicial review of arbitral awards, analogies to
FRCP 54(b) are inapt in the FAA context.
1. Legislative approval is required for piecemeal review.
Congress did not authorize judicial review of partial arbitral
awards, and regardless of whether it may be desirable to allow such
review in limited circumstances, that is a policy judgment for Congress
to make -not the courts. Until Congress acts, the courts must exercise
judicial restraint and not act unilaterally. Since the ratification of our
Constitution, courts have recognized that the "disposal of judicial
power .. . belongs to congress."'3 3 Beyond those powers the Constitution specifically gives the courts, additional judicial powers lie exclusively in Congress's hands.

and 'expertise' (49.9 percent)).
128 See, for example, Litton FinancialPrinting v NLRB, 501 US 190, 213 (1991) (acknowledging that arbitrators typically have more expertise in construing collective-bargaining agreements than courts do).
129 See, for example, CPR (USA) Inc v Spray, 187 F3d 245, 256 (2d Cir 1999) (parties included an arbitration clause specifying that the arbitrator must have expertise in Going Concern
Value "if the dispute concerns a determination with respect to the Special Bonus Pool").
130 See Part I.B.
131 See Cunningham v Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 US 198,203 (1999). See also Part I.B.
132 See note 52 and accompanying text.
133 Turner v Bank of NorthAmerica,4 US (4 Dall) 8,10 n 1 (1799).
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Courts that have made an exception to the FAA's finality requirement have overwhelmingly drawn analogies to Rule 54(b). They
hope to "avoid the possible injustice of a delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim"13' by not forcing parties to wait until all issues
have been adjudicated. 3 ' Their attempts to analogize judicial review of
partial arbitral awards to interlocutory review under FRCP 54(b) do
not survive close scrutiny.
FRCP 54(b) was created through an explicit amendment to the
rules of civil procedure modifying the final judgment rule. Without
Congress's approval, the appellate courts would not have the authority to review district court claims before the entire case had been decided. The Supreme Court has stated that in the task of construing
statutes, it is "entirely sensible" for a court to draw negative inferences
from various sections in the statutes.' 3 Since the FAA has not been
amended to include an exception similar to Rule 54(b), a negative inference can be drawn that such an exception is not authorized. This
negative inference is further strengthened by the fact that since the
Act's conception, Congress has continued amending the FAA, but has
never seen fit to loosen the finality requirement. "'
2. Rule 54(b) requires district court certification.
Rule 54(b) includes a safety valve that limits the rule's effect on
the final judgment rule. It is not enough for a lower court to enter a
"final" judgment for one, but not all, of the claims. There still can only
be appellate judicial review for that claim "upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.' If the district court does not make
such a determination, the appellate court will not have jurisdiction.
This provision allows district judges to exercise their judgment and anticipate when piecemeal review will be beneficial for both the parties
and the courts. In the cases granting judicial review of partial arbitral
134 FRCP 54(b), Advisory Committee Note to the 1946 Amendments.
135 See id. See also, for example, Metallgesellschaft AG
v M/V Capitan Constante 790 F2d
280 (2d Cir 1986) ("It would be a perversion of this salutary design for a [party]
to be denied ...
prompt and commercially important relief").
136 See, for example, Lindh v Murphy, 521 US 320,336-37
(1997); Sandin v Conner,515 US
472,481 (1995).
137 For example, in 1988 Congress amended the FAA to
permit parties in certain situations
to allow for the immediate appeal of orders enjoining arbitration. Judicial
Improvements and
Access to Justice Act, Pub L No 100-702 § 1019, 102 Stat 4670 (1988), codified
as amended at 9
USC § 16. This was intended to ensure that parties were not forced to wait
until a trial has been
completed to appeal the denial of arbitration. See id.
138 FRCP 54(b).
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awards, the arbitrator did not make such determinations. Rather, the

courts decided for themselves whether review was timely and desirable.
Cases such as Metallgesellschafl and Publicis,which allow judicial

review of partial arbitral awards, invoke the policy rationale of FRCP
54(b), but do not adhere to the safeguard found in the rule. These
cases go farther than FRCP 54(b), because FRCP 54(b) has been interpreted not to apply to cases where there is a single claim, but rather

just two phases of the same claim.' Yet, in Hart Surgical,this is exactly
what the court permitted. Not adhering to safeguards is dangerous befor
contracted
' 4°
cause it undermines the bargain that the partiesofhave
justice.
delays
longer
in
results
and more often than not
Allowing arbitrators to sign off on allowing judicial review of a
partial arbitral award, however, is not a sufficient solution. The arbitrator cannot exceed his or her power, which is defined by the parties'
agreement. To do so can result in the award being vacated under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. Parties have the power to tailor their contracts to their needs; if parties choose not to, the court should not alter
the bargained-for contract ex post. Doing so would benefit one party
at the expense of another. Also, FRCP 54(b) was not meant to overturn the settled federal rule of prohibiting piecemeal disposal of litigais a
tion.'' Avoiding review before the entire case has been decided
42
rule that can be traced back to early English common law. Given
See, for example, Williams v St. Louis Diecasting Corp, 611 F2d 1223,1224 (8th Cir 1979)
(explaining why FRCP 54(b) is not a valid basis for appeal); Western Geophysical Co of America
v Bolt Associates, Inc, 463 F2d 101,102 (2d Cir 1972) (stating that "a judgment determining liability but not fixing damages is not final" for the purposes of FRCP 54(b)).
140 See Metallgesellschaft, 790 F2d at 285 (Feinberg dissenfing) ("[I1n the long run, I fear
that confirmation of such separate and independent claims will make arbitration more complicated, time consuming and expensive."). See also Landes, 22 J Legal Stud 99 (cited in note 123);
Part I.A.
141 See FRCP 54(b), Advisory Committee Note to the 1946 Amendments ("The historic
rule in the federal courts has always prohibited piecemeal disposal of litigation ... [Rule 54(b)]
was not designed to overturn the settled federal rule.").
142 See Hohorst v Hamburg-American Packet Co, 148 US 262, 265 (1893), quoting Hol139

combe v McKusick, 61 US (20 How) 552,554 (1857):
It is the settled principle of this court, and the same in the King's Bench in England, that
the writ will not lie until the whole of the matters in controversy in the suit below are disposed of. The writ itself is conditional, and does not authorize the court below to send up
the case, unless all the matters between the parties to the record have been determined.
See also United States v Girault,52 US (11 How) 22,32 (1850) ("The writ is conditional, and does
not authorize the court below to send up the case unless all the matters between all the parties to
the record have been finally disposed of. The case is not to be sent up in fragments, by a succession of writs of error."); Houston v Moore, 16 US (3 Wheat) 433,434 (1818) ("The appellate jurisdiction of this court, under the 25th section of the judiciary act, ch. 20. extends only to a final
judgment or decree of the highest courts of law or equity in the cases specified.").
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that the Advisory Committee did not want to overturn this rule, it is
clear that courts do not have the legislature's approval to review arbitral awards beyond the scope listed here.
CONCLUSION

At first blush, the differences between allowing an appeal from a
non-final decision by a district court judge for review in an appellate
court and allowing an appeal from a partial arbitral award by an arbitrator for review in a district court seem trivial. However, they are not.
Congress has not authorized appeals of partial awards by arbitrators.
Furthermore, a loose finality requirement undermines the goals of
deference to the arbitrators and the potential advantages gained due
to the arbitrator's expertise. Finally, arbitration is a creature of contract and requires affirmative agreement before a party can be bound.
Parties can address potential problems ex ante. Any attempt to address problems ex post rewrites the deal that the parties bargained for
and should be avoided. Courts should therefore strictly enforce the finality requirement of 9 USC § 10(a)(4) unless Congress decides otherwise.
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